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I. THE REFORM ACT AND ITS INITIAL IMPACT
In late December 1995, over the veto of President Clinton, Congress
passed the most sweeping revision of the federal securities laws since 1933-
34, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA" or
"Reform Act").' The view that the securities litigation system did not work
and needed repair provided the impetus for this legislation. The system's
supposed failings were that cases were filed too often, based merely upon the
fact that a stock price had dropped ten percent or more. In addition, it was
asserted that almost all cases settled, on terms which did not relate to the
merits of the claims asserted but rather were formulaic.
2
The resulting changes were a bonanza for public companies and their
insiders, investment bankers and financial accounting firms, i.e., the normal
defendants in securities cases. Higher pleading standards, automatic
discovery stays, a "safe harbor" that arguably permits corporate executives to
lie about future results even while insiders are trading, damage limitations,
elimination of joint-and-several liability for reckless conduct, and-for good
measure-a mandatory sanction review procedure that upon termination of
every case threatens plaintiffs' counsel with up to one hundred percent
liability for defendants' fees. Basically, the Reform Act amounted to a
defense lawyer's "wish list" of new tools and tactics to delay and defeat
securities fraud claims and harass and intimidate plaintiffs' counsel.
Legislation this radical is not the result of spontaneous combustion. It
requires an orchestrated effort, often including some purportedly objective
academic work identifying a problem that requires a legislative solution. In
the case of PSLRA, proponents of curtailing investors' remedies relied
heavily upon Professor Janet Cooper Alexander's article, Do The Merits
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, published in the
Stanford Law Review ("Alexander Study"). 3 Alexander did a study of a
group of securities cases involving initial public offerings ("IPOs") in
computer-related businesses. Based on her study, Alexander claimed that:
(i) Suits were filed "against every company in the industry whose
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
2. See 140 CONG. REC. S3695, S3706 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statements of Sen. Dodd &
Sen. Domenici).
3. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 98 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S1075
(daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 139 CONG. REC. S16,662-63 (daily ed. Nov. 20,
1993) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 141 CONG. REc. S8895-98 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of
Sen. D'Amato); H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at 1 (1995).
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stock declined significantly in the months following its initial stock
offering";
4
(ii) Virtually every suit settled;5 and
(iii) Most cases settled for almost precisely 25% of the damage
exposure, and where they did not, the deviations could be "accounted
for by non-merits-related factors.
' 6
Thus, to Alexander, the merits did not matter-the current system was
defective, if not corrupt, and required fixing. It was, to say the least, a searing
indictment of a major area of litigation.
In fact, Alexander testified in favor of Reform Act legislation before the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. There, she
claimed:
The problem is not, as it is often phrased, that there is an excessive
amount of securities litigation, that there is an epidemic of frivolous
litigation, or that the economy is being crippled by extortionate
settlements. The problem is more fundamental and more difficult to
solve: as an institution, securities class action litigation is not doing a
good job of telling good suits from bad ones, of resolving suits based
on the strength of the evidence that a violation was committed, of
eliminating weak and nonmeritorious suits at an early stage, or of
delivering compensation to the investors in whose name the cases are
brought. As a result, some suits are filed that should not be, and some
suits probably are not filed that should be; plaintiffs in some weak
cases are overcompensated, and those in some strong cases are
undercompensated....
The primary public policy goal of private enforcement is
deterrence. But if settlements do not sufficiently reflect the merits, the
goal of deterrence cannot be achieved. Firms and managers cease to
regard damage judgments as the consequence of illegal behavior and a
powerful incentive to comply with the law. Instead, they come to view
being sued as a business risk beyond their control, like a downturn in
the economy or a shift in consumer preferences.
Some high technology companies, for example, have begun to treat
securities class action litigation as a cost of business which cannot be
avoided even by scrupulous due diligence and compliance programs,
and are building it into their budgets and the price of their products.
4. Alexander, supra note 3, at 500.
5. See id.
6. Id.
1998]
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The reasons why settlements in securities class actions are not
sufficiently responsive to the merits are discussed in an article [Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991)] that is attached to my testimony ....
Securities class action litigation is costly. In 1992 and 1993 alone,
145 such cases were settled for total payments of $3 billion.
Approximately 30% of this amount, or close to $1 billion, went to
plaintiffs' attorneys. The fees paid to defendants' lawyers probably
totaled another $1 billion or more. There is a serious question whether
the benefits, in the form of deterrence and compensation, of securities
class action litigation as it is practiced today justify these costs. 7
Prior to Congress' sweeping revision of the federal securities laws via the
Reform Act, Alexander's article had met with mixed reactions. A few courts
cited it, assuming that its data were reliable and its conclusions valid.8
Several law review articles relied upon Alexander's article as proof of the
existence of meritless claims in the securities litigation area. 9 As discussion
of the need for securities litigation reform continued, Arthur Levitt, the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), referred to
the substance of Alexander's conclusions as an indication of flaws in the way
securities cases were litigated, supporting the need for legislative action.'
0
However, other commentators suggested in scholarly articles," specialized
7. Securities Litigation Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunication and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Janet Cooper Alexander,
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) (emphasis added).
8. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 939 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 1991); Weinberger v.
Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518,524 (1st Cir. 1991); In re Urcarco Sec. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 566
(N.D. Tex. 1993); In re VeriFone Sec. Litig, 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 n.22 (N.D. Cal. 1992), afJ'd, 11 F.3d
865 (9th Cir. 1993); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal. 4th 1082, 1107 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: A Panel Discussion,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1199, 1215-16 & n.20 (1993); Jill E. Fisch,As Time Goes By: New Questions About the
Statute of Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. SI01, S125 & n.167 (1993); Anthony Q.
Fletcher, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Growth Companies, Nuisance Suits, and Congressional Proposals
For Securities Litigation Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493,503 & nn.53-57 (1995); Bryant Garth, Front
Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 931, 943 & n.50 (1993); Adam F. Ingber, 10b-5 or not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform
Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. S351, S360-61 & n.64 (1993); Stephen E.
Morrissey, State Settlement Class Actions that Release Exclusive Federal Claims: Developing a
Framework for Multjurisdictional Management of Shareholder Litigation, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1765,
1765-66 & n.3 (1995).
10. See Chairman Arthur Levitt, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Address at Securities
Regulation Institute, University of California, San Diego (Jan. 26, 1994). According to Levitt, "some allege
that settlements often fail to reflect the underlying merits of the cases. If true, this means that weak claims
are overcompensated and strong claims are undercompensated." Id.
11. See Ingber, supra note 9, at S361-62; Steven P. Marino & Rene D. Marino, An Empirical Study
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publications, 12 and congressional testimony13 that Alexander was wrong.
Nevertheless, Congress accepted Alexander's work and enacted the Reform
Act.
Recently, a careful review of Alexander's statistical analysis by Leonard
B. Simon and William S. Dato has been published ("Simon/Dato Study").' 4
The results are startling. Not only is Alexander's study fundamentally
flawed, but her conclusions are inconsistent with both a replication of her
study done with her most obvious flaws corrected, and a broader, more
reliable study.' 5 Alexander adjusted her data, which had the effect of creating
the conclusion she wanted.
16
According to the Simon/Dato Study, there is little doubt now that
Congress legislated on the basis of erroneous data in 1995.17 Although it
remains to be seen what Congress has wrought, the Reform Act cannot solve
the "problem" identified by Alexander, because the problem she described
does not exist. Whatever one's view on securities litigation and the Reform
Act, the history of Alexander's study should be carefully scrutinized as it
provides a cautionary tale about the use of seemingly objective academic
studies, even from a prestigious institution, as a basis for legislation.'
8
Every experienced practitioner in the field of securities law that I know
found Alexander's conclusions surprising and contrary to their intuition and
experience. All experienced practitioners know that strong cases generally
settle for more than weak cases, other things being equal. Those who actually
of Recent Securities Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC.
REG. L.J 115, 142 (1994); Lester B. Snyder & Jerry G. Gonick, The Interrelationship of Securities Class
Action Litigation and Pension Plan Tax Policy: What's Really at Stake?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 123, 126 nA
(1993).
12. See In Camera, 14 CLASS ACTION REP. 1, 70 (1991).
13. See Securities Litigation Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Professor John
C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia University Law School). Labeling as a "myth" Professor Alexander's conclusion
that .'It]he merits don't matter,"' Professor Coffee offers his personal judgment "that the merits do
matter-but not enough." Id. at 1, 5.
14. See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The
Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 959 (1996). Simon and Dato are partners of mine. The Simon/Dato Study relied heavily
upon data provided by Princeton Venture Research, which has appeared as an expert for our firm in several
securities class actions. See id. at 959 n.*.
15. See id. at 962-64.
16. See id. at 978-984.
17. See generally id.
18. Compounding the problems caused by Alexander's Stanford Law Review article, she has
published two additional articles which utilize the same data and has relied on her prior conclusions in
addressing other related topics. See Janet C. Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1422-23, 1439 (1994); Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why
Initial Public Offerings are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17,50,53,57 (1993).
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litigate and settle securities class actions know that the strength of a case is
often the first matter discussed in settlement talks and, along with
defendants' ability to pay, typically drives the discussion and the result. If
Alexander was right, the real life experiences of virtually every practitioner
were delusional.
For instance, settlements in In re American Continental/Lincoln Savings
& Loan Securities Litigation yielded approximately $250 million, over
eighty percent of total damages of $288 million.' 9 One of approximately one
hundred defendants in that case, Ernst & Young alone paid $63 million to
settle the case. Did the merits matter in Lincoln Savings? Of course. What
about those other securities cases where $50 million or greater settlements
were achieved, that is, L.A. Gear, Miniscribe, Salomon Brothers, U.S.
Financial, Equity Funding, 1DB Communications, National Health Labs?
Were they all "formulaic" settlements without regard for the merits? Of
course not. How did Alexander reach a conclusion so at odds with real life
experience?
Simon and Dato undertook a scientific review of Alexander's work. They
found that:
1. "The sample utilized in Professor Alexander's study [was] far too
small and too homogenous to prove anything conclusive."
20
2. Alexander "did not apply consistent principles to the samples
contained in the study, but rather made ad hoc adjustments to conform
the data to her thesis"; that is, she "fixes" her result.
2
'
3. "Alexander made several errors in data gathering and calculation
which call into question her scholarship and undermine her
conclusions. 22
Simon and Dato also repeated Alexander's study as she defined it (still
too small and homogeneous) but without her data errors and omissions. The
resulting eleven settlements range from a high of nearly seventy percent of
gross market loss to a low of two percent, with only five of the settlements
falling within Alexander's twenty to thirty percent range.23 Further, if the
damage "stakes" are adjusted to account for the general movement of the
market-which always occurs in the real world settlement context-the
eleven settlements range from a high of nearly eighty percent to a low of less
19. MDL Docket No. 834 (D. Ariz.).
20. Simon & Dato, supra note 14, at 964.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id at 990.
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than three percent, with only three of the settlements falling within
Alexander's twenty to thirty percent range.24 Thus, the corrected Alexander
Study tells a very different story than the one Alexander presented-a story
of "formulaic" twenty-five percent settlements.
Not satisfied to simply critique and reanalyze Alexander's work, to show
its gross errors, Simon and Dato performed their own study in a broader but
still limited subset of the universe from which Alexander sought to draw
conclusions: all securities class action lawsuits. The purpose of the
Simon/Dato Study was to see if the results of the Alexander Study could be
replicated in a larger sample. If Alexander's conclusions were valid, they
should apply not only to her sample-venture capital-backed computer
companies which went public in early 1983-but also to other industries and
other time periods. The Simon/Dato Study shows Alexander's results cannot
be replicated.
No case more graphically demonstrates the deficiency of Alexander's
study than Knapp v. Gomez.25 That venture capital-backed IPO was within
Alexander's universe. She knew of the company and IPO and dismissed it as
a situation where no litigation was filed because the stakes were too small to
attract plaintiffs' attorneys. Yet, before Alexander's study was published, the
company (ATV) had been sued for securities fraud in a class action suit. The
suit resulted not in a twenty-five percent formulaic settlement, but a one
hundred percent recovery after trial and appeal to the United States Supreme
Court-a ten-year ordeal! In fact, this case was completely inconsistent with
all the core findings of Alexander's study. No doubt this case was yet another
example of avaricious plaintiffs' lawyers who sue fast, settle quickly for
twenty-five percent, and then move on to their next prey. Omission of a case
so key-even if it was due to oversight--completely discredits the Alexander
study.
Because Alexander's study contains methodological flaws and her
findings cannot be replicated in a broader, more representative sample, it
seems clear that Alexander's conclusions were incorrect. Others can judge
for themselves if this was due to sloppy scholarship or deliberate
manipulation of data to reach a preconceived result. But the Simon/Dato
Study suggests that the merits do matter in settling securities cases, and more
incontrovertibly, that Alexander's contrary hypothesis is not supported by
her--or objective-data.
Well, tough luck. It is not the first time Congress has been deceived by
24. See id.
25. No. CV 87-0067 H(M), 1993 WL 305940 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 1993).
1998]
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biased academic data. For now, we are stuck with the Reform Act. Some
believe that a coming stockmarket collapse coupled with an already
observable upsurge of securities fraud may later produce a legislative
"rollback" of the Reform Act, but no one knows when or if that will ever
happen. So, what is its impact so far?
In late February 1997, two colleagues of Professor Alexander, Professors
Grndfest and Perino of Stanford Law and Business Schools, published a
report in conjunction with Cornerstone Research entitled Securities Litigation
Reform: The First Year's Experience ("Grundfest/Perino Study").2 6
Cornerstone Research is a California-based consulting firm that works for
corporate defendants in securities cases. The data gathered for the
Grundfest/Perino Study came mostly from a website, known as the Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse maintained by Stanford. The Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse was established with funding from, among others,
George Roberts of Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts (a leveraged-buyout firm that
has repeatedly been sued for securities and corporate law violations). It is
supported by the National Center for Automated Information Research, Sun
Microsystems, and Apple Computer Corporation, two high-tech companies
that had paid millions to settle the securities fraud claims against them and
were strong advocates of the Reform Act.
The GrundfestPerino Study reaches several conclusions:
Overall litigation rates are little changed.
Our best estimate is that class action securities fraud litigation in
federal and state court is being filed at an annual rate of 148 to 163
defendant issuers per year. Prior to the Reform Act, litigation was
being filed at a rate of approximately 176 defendant issuers per year.
The total volume of litigation activity in 1996 is thus down by about
7% to 16%, but is not very different from the level of activity
observed in 1991, 1993, and 1995. In addition, increasing stock
market prices in 1996 may have depressed litigation activity. It is
therefore too soon to draw any firm conclusions as to whether
litigation reform has had any material effect on the aggregate
securities class action litigation rate.
0 About 26% of litigation activity has moved from federal court
to state court.
The relative stability of the aggregate litigation rate masks a
significant shift of activity from federal to state court. Approximately
26. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES REGULATION 1997, at 955, 958 (1997).
[VOL. 76:597
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss2/5
PSLRA'S BRAVE NEW WORLD
26% of class action claims are state court proceedings without parallel
federal claims filed in 1996. This increase in state court litigation is
likely the result of a "substitution effect" whereby plaintiffs' counsel
file state court complaints when the underlying facts appear not to be
sufficient to satisfy new, more stringent federal pleading requirements,
or otherwise seek to avoid the substantive or procedural provisions of
the Act. Plaintiffs may also be resorting to increased parallel state and
federal litigation in an effort to avoid federal discovery stays or to
establish alternative state court venues for the settlement of federal
claims.
0 Allegations of accounting irregularities or trading by insiders
now explain the lion's share of federal class action litigation.
Approximately 67% of post-Reform Act Section 10(b) complaints
involving publicly-traded companies allege accounting fraud as a basis
for liability. In sharp contrast, similar allegations are found in only
34% of pre-Reform Act cases. Allegations of trading by insiders now
appear in about 57% of post-Reform Act cases, whereas these
allegations are found in only 21% of pre-Reform Act cases. Alleged
trading by insiders is particularly important in cases against high
technology companies, appearing in 73% of those cases, but that
statistic must be interpreted with caution because of the prevalence of
option-based compensation in the high technology sector.
* Pure "false forecast" cases explain a relatively small
percentage of pending Reform Act claims.
Complaints alleging false forward-looking statements as the sole
basis for liability account for only about 14% of all post-Reform Act
complaints analyzed, and only about 6.5% of post-Reform Act federal
complaints involving publicly-traded companies.
; Litigation typically follows larger price declines than observed
prior to the Reform Act.
Prior to the Reform Act, the average stock price decline preceding
the filing of a claim was about 19%. During 1996, the average decline
jumped to 31%. This increase is consistent with the observation that
heightened pleading requirements induce plaintiffs' counsel to pursue
cases that are correlated with larger price declines, and therefore seem
to be more apparent instances of fraud.
* Federal claims are now rarely filed against the largest issuers.
The average company sued in a federal securities fraud class action
in 1996 had a market capitalization of $529.3 million. Prior to the
Reform Act, the average market capitalization was $2080 million.
This decline appears to be attributable almost exclusively to a
19981
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reduction in litigation naming issuers with market capitalization in
excess of $5.0 billion. Prior to the Reform Act, these large
corporations represented about 8.4% of federal court activity, but very
few of these companies appear to have been sued in 1996.
0 High technology issuers continue to be the most frequent
targets of class action litigation.
High technology companies represent 34% of all issuers sued in
federal court since the effective date of the Reform Act. That statistic
is not materially different from the pre-Reform Act experience.
0 The dominant plaintiffs' class action law firm, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, appears to have increased its
significance nationally and in California in particular.
Milberg Weiss' appearance ratio nationwide stood at
approximately 31% prior to the Reform Act. Aggregating parallel
federal and state activity, Milberg Weiss' appearance ratio today
stands at about 59% nationwide and 83% in California. Milberg
Weiss' increased significance can be explained by the fact that it is
likely the best capitalized plaintiffs' firm and therefore best able to
finance the delays associated with slower procedures under the
Reform Act. It also has the most diversified portfolio of plaintiffs'
claims and is therefore better able to absorb the risk associated with
litigation under the new regime. In addition, it is best situated to
internalize the externalities associated with the need to invest to create
new precedent interpreting the Reform Act's novel provisions.
* In the courthouse, judges appear to be resolving legal
questions regarding the interpretation of the "strong inference"
requirement in favor of plaintiffs.
The most frequently litigated issue to date-the interpretation of
the "strong inference" pleading requirement-has with but a single
exception been uniformly interpreted to apply the Second Circuit
standard, not some higher pleading requirement. This is the position
espoused by plaintiffs. Moreover, no complaint subject to the "strong
inference" pleading standard has been dismissed without permitting
plaintiffs the opportunity to replead a material portion of the claims
asserted in the original complaint.
0 The growth of parallel state and federal litigation, with
concomitant disputes over discovery stays and other matters,
suggests that attention to federal preemption issues is warranted.
In addition to the growth in "pure" state class action fraud claims,
at least 28% of federal class action securities fraud cases also have
pending parallel state securities fraud class action claims. Parallel state
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court securities fraud class actions were quite rare prior to the Reform
Act. This parallel litigation appears to be brought to avoid the Reform
Act stay on discovery, and perhaps for other strategic and settlement-
related reasons as well. This boom in state class action securities fraud
litigation raises issues regarding the optimal coordination of federal
and state litigation regimes and suggests that a systematic review of
the issue by Congress is in order.27
The Grundfest/Perino Study's conclusion that securities fraud litigation
after the Reform Act continued at approximately the same levels as in
previous years should be viewed with caution. If the inference to be drawn
from this is that the Reform Act is benign to victims of securities fraud, that
is likely an erroneous conclusion. The absolute number of securities fraud
class actions filed is meaningful only as compared to the amount of fraud that
is occurring in the marketplace. In other words, if the amount of fraud
doubled, but litigation rates to remedy fraud remained constant, one might
well conclude that the Reform Act had drastically curtailed the access to civil
justice by victims of securities fraud. Of course, measuring the amount of
fraud that is going on in the market place at any one time is a very difficult
task. However, many believe that the amount of fraud going on in the
securities markets today is higher than it has ever been, as opportunistic
companies and dishonest underwriters take advantage of the frothiest market
in history to foist overvalued issues on the public. Corporate executives,
emboldened by what they think is legal immunity for false forecasts of future
corporate performance, have been emboldened to overstate corporate
prospects, even while engaging in insider trading. And even, as Business
Week and The New York Times have recently reported, the mafia has moved
to Wall Street to exploit IPOs and stock manipulation opportunities.28 Thus,
one should be very cautious about what, if any, conclusions to draw about
investor protection from looking at absolute litigation rates in the post-
Reform Act era.
There are additional reasons to be cautious in drawing conclusions about
the impact of the Reform Act. It is one thing to file a securities fraud class
action complaint. It is quite another to accomplish a significant financial
recovery for victims of fraud. Thus far, only a handful of Reform Act cases
have survived the motion to dismiss stage, and the financial recoveries to
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, More Copies of U.S. Strategy are Missing in Mob Stock Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at B3; Gary Weiss, The Mob is Busier than the Feds Think, Bus. WEEK,
Dec. 15, 1997, at 130.
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date are very limited. The procedural mechanics of the Reform Act involving
the automatic discovery stay and the time-consuming lead plaintiff
designation procedures have served to slow down the progress of these
litigations and likely are increasing the overall legal costs involved in these
cases. It will take many more years to evaluate whether victims of real fraud
are able to achieve significant financial recoveries under the Reform Act.
Unless and until the possibility of such recoveries is demonstrated, no valid
conclusion can be reached as to the impact of the Reform Act on cheated
investors.
The Grundfest/Perino Study is undoubtedly correct in concluding that
there has been an increase in the number of securities fraud class action cases
filed in state court. However, its suggestion that state court cases are being
filed because the facts alleged there could not survive the enhanced pleading
standards imposed by the Reform Act is unsupported by any evidence,
empirical or otherwise. The SEC in mid-April 1997 issued its own study of
the impact of the Reform Act in a report to President Clinton. The Report to
the President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 stated:
The discovery stay imposed by the Act during the pendency of a
motion to dismiss, coupled with the heightened pleading standards,
has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring and prosecute
securities class action lawsuits. No cases to date have been dismissed
without leave to amend because of the new pleading standards.
Plaintiffs who are unable to uncover evidence of wrongdoing
sufficient to meet those new standards prior to filing their complaints,
however, may find it difficult to amend their complaints without
access to discovery.
The number of securities class actions filed in state court has
reportedly increased. Moreover, many of the state cases are filed
parallel to a federal court case in an apparent attempt to avoid some of
the procedures imposed by the Reform Act, particularly the stay of
discovery pending a motion to dismiss. This may be the most
significant development in securities litigation post-Reform Act.
While the allegations contained in state court complaints are generally
similar to those of the federal complaints, state complaints having no
parallel federal action are more likely to be based solely on forecasts
which have not materialized and less likely to include insider trading
allegations.
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There are still many uncertainties about the effects of the Reform
Act and the staff expects to continue carefully monitoring the cases.
The staff believes that it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions
about the effect of the Reform Act on frivolous securities litigation, or,
for that matter, on meritorious litigation. Accordingly, the staff does
not recommend any legislative changes at this time.29
The Wall Street Journal on July 9, 1997, reported:
The number of securities-fraud class-action suits filed in federal
court this year has climbed back to the levels of the early 1990s,
despite a 1995 law aimed at curbing such suits, two new studies show.
The studies indicate that plaintiffs lawyers have returned to federal
court after adjusting to higher pleading standards and other hurdles
presented by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, passed over
a presidential veto in December 1995. Meanwhile, the number of
shareholder suits filed in state courts is down sharply this year, after
spiking last year, the studies show.
"The plaintiffs lawyers have figured out that it's not so bad to file
in federal court, and there's no significant advantage to filing in state
court," says Vinita Juneja, a vice president of National Economic
Research Associates Inc., a White Plains, N.Y., consulting firm that
studied both federal and state court filings.
The group found that 78 suits were filed in federal court through
May, compared with 47 last year. In state courts, it found that 19
shareholder class actions were filed through April, down from 40 in
the same period last year.
In its study, the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, a research
project run by Stanford University law school, found that 83
securities-fraud suits were filed this year in federal court through July
3. If the filings continue at that rate, there will be 166 suits filed this
year. That's roughly the same number as in the early 1990s, when
business groups lobbied Congress to make it harder for shareholders
to bring "meritless" suits in federal court. Back then, the number of
shareholder suits filed in federal court averaged about 178 a year.
Last year, the number of suits filed in federal court dropped to
about 123, as more suits were filed in state court. Observers also
29. Security & Exchange Comm'n, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of
Practice under the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 (last modified Apr. 16, 1997)
<http://www.see.gov/newststudies/Ireform.txt>.
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attributed the decline to a rush by lawyers to file federal claims in late
1995 before the law went into effect.
Both groups say the filings are back up because federal courts
haven't been as inhospitable to shareholder suits as proponents of the
new law had hoped.30
Our federal system has always had a system of dual state and federal
remedies for securities fraud, as both the 1933 and 1934 Acts were expressly
nonpreemptive. Representative Christopher Cox, a leading proponent of the
PSLRA, stated during one hearing: "if you were a plaintiff, who like any
plaintiff has a choice of form... you might file your suit in state court or in
federal court, depending on how you saw your advantage."31 Congress could
have chosen to preempt state securities fraud remedies when it enacted the
Reform Act. However, many participants in the process have publicly stated
that had such a preemptive provision been included, the Reform Act could
not have been enacted over President Clinton's veto.
In any event, there are many good reasons why victims of securities fraud
might prefer to attempt to litigate their claims in state court. Many state
courts permit plaintiffs to recover on a nine-to-three jury vote, as opposed to
the unanimous verdict required in the federal system. Many state laws permit
a recovery upon a showing of negligence, as opposed to reckless or
intentional misconduct. Some states permit recovery without any showing of
reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepresentations. Further, several state laws
provide procedural advantages for plaintiffs such as a broader jury pool
(drivers license holders versus registered voters), the ability to require a
defendant to pay the cost of class notice, interlocutory appeal procedures for
a denial of class certification and writ of mandamus procedures by which
erroneous pretrial rulings can be promptly reviewed by appellate courts. Such
advantages are normally nonexistent in the federal system.
The Grundfest/Perino Study's conclusion that more of the cases filed
under the Reform Act allege accounting fraud or insider trading is neither
surprising, nor significant. In recent years, the amount of accounting
chicanery by public companies has increased greatly. This is especially true
in the high-tech sector where the pressure to meet quarterly earnings
forecasts is intense and the companies often "pre-ship" merchandise, "stuff
the channel" and grant "sale or return" privileges to do so. That plaintiffs'
30. Dean Starkman, Securities Class-Action Lawsuits Make Comeback in Federal Court, VALL
ST. J., July 9, 1997, at BI I.
31. Common Sense Legal Reform Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 110 (1995) (Statement of Rep.
Christopher Cox).
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lawyers have become more sophisticated in figuring this out and are more
frequently utilizing forensic accountants to help plead claims should surprise
no one. There is also no doubt that the amount of insider trading by corporate
executives is at the highest levels in history.
The market is now really beginning to reap the bitter harvest of the SEC's
accommodation of the corporate community several years ago when the SEC
changed the rules relating to stock options and section 16 of the 1934 Act.
Section 16 had prohibited a corporate insider from exercising a stock option
and then selling the stock on the open market in the next six months, giving
force to Congress's mandate that corporate insiders not be allowed to reap
short-swing profits. However, some years ago, under intense pressure from
the corporate community, the SEC adopted the completely illogical rule that,
for section 16 purposes, the stock purchase in a stock option scheme occurs
when the option is granted-when no money changes hands, the executive is
at no risk of loss, and has no ability to sell the stock-and not when the
executive later actually exercises the option, pays for the stock, is at risk, and
obtains the ability to sell the stock. As a result, corporate executives have
now learned that they have immunity from section 16's short-swing profit
disgorgement rule and can exercise stock options and sell the stock on the
same day. They may thereby avoid any market risk whatsoever and instantly
capitalize on their knowledge of negative developments in their business and
industry which are not yet known to the marketplace. It is for this reason
more than any other that insider selling by corporate executives is reaching
shockingly high levels. This in turn is the reason why more and more
securities fraud cases are pleading insider trading.
The Grundfest/Perino Study's conclusion that there are relatively few
pure false forecast cases filed under the Reform Act is undoubtedly correct,
but this conclusion has little, if anything, to do with the Reform Act. As they
admit, there were relatively few pure false forecast cases filed before the
Reform Act was adopted. Pure false forecast cases, that is, cases where there
was no motive to lie (such as insider selling or merger or acquisition
activities), are extremely weak cases. The existing economic incentives of the
securities class action litigation system where plaintiffs' counsel must work
on a contingency basis and invest large out-of-pocket sums to prosecute these
cases, has always made pure false forecast cases very high risk and, thus, few
in number.
The GrundfestlPerino Study's conclusion that cases filed in the Reform
Act era are being filed following larger price declines than was the case
before, if statistically correct, is again of uncertain significance. Two factors
probably account for this. First, because plaintiffs' lawyers are now taking
longer to prepare securities class action suits, many of them are being filed
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several weeks after the initial stock drop caused by the unanticipated
revelation of bad news, rather than several days after that adverse revelation.
Thus, by the time most Reform Act cases are filed, the stock has declined
further than would have been the case with a pre-Reform Act filing. Also, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that during 1996-97, the stock market had been
trading at extraordinarily high (some would say inflated) levels. As a result,
the market has become even more unforgiving upon the disclosure of
negative information, resulting in larger stock collapses when the truth comes
out.
The Grundfest/Perino Study also concluded that smaller companies are
being sued more frequently in the Reform Act era. If true, this increase may
be because the amount of fraud by smaller companies coming public to
benefit from unprecedented markets has significantly increased. Numerous
publications have reported that the quality of IPOs is at an all-time low. We
repeatedly encounter the phenomenon of new public companies coming out
at high prices, pushed even higher in the aftermarket with the help of a
"booster shot" or two from the underwriters, and reporting a good quarter or
two before the stock collapses on an eamings disappointment. Investigation
then reveals that insiders sold large amounts of stock shortly after the
expiration of the "lockup period" imposed by the underwriters. Thus, it
seems of no particular significance that smaller companies are being sued
more frequently in this late, frothy phase of the bull market of our generation.
The GrundfestlPerino Study's conclusion that companies in the high-tech
sector continue to account for the largest single group sued for securities
violations is again, of dubious significance. Given the accounting tricks high-
tech companies regularly employ to boost their quarterly eamings and the
persistent high levels of insider selling by high-tech corporate executives
who depend on stock-option-related sales for compensation, it is not
surprising that these companies end up in securities fraud litigations more
frequently than more staid, stable enterprises.
The Grundfest/Perino Study's conclusion that my firm, Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, has supposedly increased its "appearance
rate" in the Reform Act era strikes rather close to home. But, as Congress
was warned when it was considering the Reform Act, the mandatory sanction
review provision of the Reform Act was so draconian that it inevitably would
result in many competent but smaller firms or sole practitioners refusing to
bring securities class action suits, no matter how meritorious they might
believe the case to be. I told Congress that the mandatory sanction provision
in the hands of a mean-spirited or ideological judge (and there are some of
both) was a tool to destroy a lifetime's law practice as a result of one suit.
Under those circumstances, I warned, many practitioners would refuse to
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become involved in these types of litigations. My predictions have proved
true. We have seen smaller firms or sole practitioners either not file securities
class action cases, even though they were meritorious, or to seek out larger,
more well-capitalized litigation partners to joint-venture cases with them.
Finally, I must take exception to the GrundfestlPerino Study's conclusion
that the courts are interpreting the strong inference standard "in favor of
plaintiffs." This is a ridiculous conclusion to reach after only a few motions
to dismiss Reform Act complaints have even been determined. It is even
more absurd in light of the fact that several federal judges have held that the
Reform Act's heightened pleading standard eliminates the recklessness
liability standard. One federal judge, the Honorable Fern Smith, in In re
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation,32 held that the Reform Act
required the pleading of intentional or knowing misconduct, that is, it
eliminated recklessness liability, and dismissed as inadequate a complaint
that alleged top insiders at Silicon Graphics sold off 388,000 shares of their
stock for about fourteen million dollars in just a thirty-day period. This sell-
off occurred while Silicon Graphics insiders were using the corporation's
money to repurchase one million shares of SGI stock on the open market,
thus supporting the stock's price while they unloaded their shares. Just
several weeks later, the stock collapsed to all-time lows when it was revealed
that new products could not be shipped due to technical problems.33
District courts have dismissed several cases that contain highly specific
allegations of accounting fraud and insider trading.34 Judge Patel went even
further in Hockey v. Medhekar,35 where he held that not only does an actual
intent standard apply, but also that the license to lie granted by the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements covers statements about the current
condition of the business because they are necessary assumptions underlying
or relating to the forward-looking statements and entitled to the same
protection.
Silicon Graphics and Hockey are not benign decisions. They threaten the
very underpinnings of honesty in our securities markets and, if they spread,
32. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
33. A second federal judge, the Honorable Rudi Brewster, in Powers v. Eichen, 997 F. Supp. 1031
(S.D. Cal. 1997), followed Judge Smith's erroneous holding that the Reform Act eliminated recklessness
scienter but sustained the Powers complaint, holding it met even the higher actual knowledge standard
because of the massive insider selling alleged. A third federal judge, the Honorable Edward Harrington, in
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997), followed Silicon Graphics but also
upheld the complaint due to large insider stock sales.
34. See Orman v. America Online, Inc., No. 97-264-A (E.D. Va. July 11, 1997); Zeid v.
Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
35. [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,465 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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could lead to more fraud-unremedied fraud-that will undermine investor
confidence in the markets and, in time, impair capital formation.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Cooper v. Pickett,36 however, indicates
that these anti-investor decisions by district court judges in the Northern
District of California are unlikely to be upheld. Cooper reversed the district
court's dismissal of a complaint alleging that a public company, two
underwriting firms, and the company's public accountants schemed to
defraud investors by making false positive statements about the company's
business and future prospects while falsifying its reported financial results.37
The Ninth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs' allegations of accounting fraud were
sufficiently specific in describing the accounting tricks used, the customers
involved, and the approximate amounts by which the company's financial
results were overstated, even though the complaint did not identify a single
specific transaction involving a specific customer which was bogus.38 The
Ninth Circuit also held that the company was liable for false information it
disseminated to the market indirectly through analysts, either in conference
calls or by privately feeding information to analysts for inclusion in reports
written by the analysts. Although the complaint alleged the conference calls
took place, the Ninth Circuit ruled that defendants could not present
purported transcripts of the conference calls, which they claimed contradicted
plaintiffs' allegations, at the 12(b)(6) motion stage.39 The Ninth Circuit in
Cooper also ruled that even though Central Bank stated there is no longer
"aiding and abetting" or "conspiracy" liability, liability still exists under Rule
1Ob-5 for participating in afraudulent scheme. The court therefore held that a
fraudulent scheme was adequately alleged involving the company, its top
officers, two underwriting houses whose analysts issued false reports on the
company, and the company's independent auditors.40
While Cooper is a pre-PSLRA decision, it is likely to have a significant
impact on post-PSLRA litigation. The Ninth Circuit's holding that the
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b), in essence, provides guidance on what types of
allegations of falsity, especially false financial statement allegations, will
satisfy the first prong of the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard. Further,
Cooper's holdings regarding what may be considered on a motion to dismiss,
the responsibility of a company for false information its insiders disseminate
to the market indirectly through analysts, and its recognition of scheme
36. 122 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997).
37. See id. at 1190.
38. See id. at 1198.
39. See id. at 1192.
40. See id. at 1191, 1195.
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liability in the post-Central Bank world will all be of significance in post-
PSLRA cases.
However, prior to enactment of the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit required
only scienter to be alleged under GlenFed. Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not
reach the issue of whether the allegations in the Cooper complaint raised a
strong inference of scienter. Cooper merely noted the passage of the PSLRA
and its heightened pleading standard in a footnote, without indicating one
way or another how the Cooper complaint would have fared. Certainly,
Cooper indicates that, in the Ninth Circuit, the great battleground in post-
PSLRA litigation will be over the "strong inference of the required state of
mind" pleading requirement.
It is still far too early to conclude that the enhanced pleading standard will
not be either misapplied by courts to create an actual knowledge/intentional
wrongdoing standard or, even if properly applied, will nevertheless not be
used to dismiss meritorious cases.4 As of January 25, 1998, here is the
scorecard on motions to dismiss under the Reform Act after twenty-four
months. There have been fifty-five motions to dismiss decided under the
PSLRA. In twenty-nine cases, the district court upheld the complaint as
meeting the heightened pleading standard. In twenty-six cases, district courts
held the complaint did not meet the heightened standard.
The geographic location of the dismissals is quite interesting. In the
Northern District of California-home to the largest concentration of venture
capital outfits, high-tech/bio-tech public companies, and underwriting houses
specializing in high-tech/bio-tech IPOs--every motion to dismiss a Reform
Act complaint was granted, two with prejudice and five without prejudice.
Thus, one hundred percent of the complaints filed in the Northern District
were held not to meet the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA.
41. The PSLRA did not change traditional 12(bX6) rules. See Epstein v. Itron, No. CS-97-214-
RHW (E.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 1998); In re Ride, Inc. See. Liti&, No. C97-402WD (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1,
1997); In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1997); Cherednichenko v.
Quarterdeck Corp., No. CV 97-4320-GHK(CWX) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1997); In re Valujet, Inc. See.
Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Galaxy Inv. Fund v. Fenchurch Capital Mgmt, No. 96 C
8098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207 (N.D. II1. Aug. 29, 1997), adopted as a finding of the court,
Galaxy Inv. Fund v. Fenchurch Capital Mgmt., No. 96 C 8098 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1997); In re
Cephalon See. Litig., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,562 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Gross v.
Medaphis Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal.
1997); In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); OnBank & Trust Co.
v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Wellcare Management Group Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp.
632 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp.
1246 (N.D. III. 1997); Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorporation, No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 686565
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
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Outside the Northern District, however, the story is quite different. Over
sixty percent of post-PSLRA complaints filed outside the Northern District
were sustained, and just four were dismissed with prejudice. In the Central
and Southern Districts of California, every post-PSLRA complaint
challenged to date was held to satisfy the Reform Act's pleading standard.
Over sixty percent of the complaints filed outside the Northern District
(twenty-nine of forty-eight complaints) were held to meet the heightened
pleading standard of the PSLRA while no complaints filed in the Northern
District were held to meet the heightened pleading standard.
This geographical divergence is quite interesting and may be due to any
number of factors. It may be that district judges in the Northern District of
California, applying a new scienter pleading standard with which they were
completely unfamiliar prior to the passage of the PSLRA, are deciding all
these cases perfectly correctly. Another explanation may be that there simply
is no fraud being committed by high-tech/bio-tech companies in the Northern
District. Of course, there also may be other explanations as well. In any
event, it is clear that there will be a number of appellate court decisions over
the next several years before the real parameters of the PSLRA's pleading
standard are delineated.
II. THE REFORM ACT'S SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS Do NOT APPLY TO
FALSE STATEMENTS MADE PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVE DATE
The Reform Act applies only to conduct occurring after December 22,
1995.42 The Reform Act's language dealing with applicability prohibits
retroactivity: "The amendments made by this title shall not affect or apply to
any private action arising under title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or title I of the Securities Act of 1933, commenced before and pending on
[December 22, 19 95]. ' 3
The Reform Act states it will not apply topending cases. However, it does
not relate if it applies to conduct occurring before the Reform Act's effective
date, but alleged in cases filed after December 22, 1995. This silence should
be understood to foreclose retroactivity. Where Congress has not stated
whether legislation applies to preenactment conduct, there is a strong
presumption against retroactivity. The Supreme Court has mandated a strong
presumption against retroactive application of statutes to preenactment
conduct in the absence of an explicit congressional intention to the contrary,
42. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 108, 109 Stat.
737,758.
43. Id.
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so that parties can predict the consequences of their actions.44 Thus, the
Reform Act cannot apply to preenactment conduct, because it does not
express an intention to do so.
45
A recent Supreme Court decision sheds light on this issue. In Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,46 the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit for giving retroactive effect to 1986
amendments to the False Claims Act and applying the amended law to a case
allegingpre-1986 conduct. The Court wrote:
We have frequently noted, and just recently reaffirmed, that there is a
"presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in
our jurisprudence." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,
265, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). "The 'principle
that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the
law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and
universal appeal."' Ibid. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1586, 108 L.Ed.2d
842 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Accordingly, we apply this time-
honored presumption unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent
to the contrary. 511 U.S. at 268, 114 S. Ct. at 1498-1499.
47
Of course, the PSLRA contains no such clearly manifested intent. The
Reform Act states only that "[t]he amendments made by this title shall not
affect or apply to any private action arising under title I of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or title I of the Securities Act of 1933, commenced
before and pending on [December 22, 19 95]."48 Since the PSLRA is silent on
whether or not it applies to suits filed after December 22, 1995, involving
44. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); accord SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1285-
86 (9th Cir. 1996) (legal consequences as of time of actions apply). Landgrafmapped out the retro-
activity analysis:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court'sfirst task is to
determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has
done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute
contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it
does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added).
45. See United States v. $814,254.76 in United States Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir.
1995).
46. 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997).
47. Id. at 1876 (emphasis added).
48. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 108, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995).
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conduct before December 22, 1995, the presumption against retroactive
legislation controls.
An article by Susan S. Golnick and Joseph D. Daley extensively explored
the retroactivity issue, and agrees with the conclusion that the Reform Act
cannot be applied to pre-Reform Act conduct.
49
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly recognized Landgraf s emphasis50 on
the time of the conduct and its distinction between the
impermissible/permissible application of substantive versus procedural
amendments. United States v. Bacon,51 examined the effect of a 1988 act on
conduct which took place in 1982, and concluded that the 1988 Act would
have an impermissible retroactive effect if applied in a post-enactment
lawsuit:
With [Landgraf s] principles in mind we turn to the Transfer Act's
claim extinguishment provision. This provision is not merely remedial
or procedural; it seeks to affect substantive rights....
Because the Transfer Act ... seeks to affect the government's
substantive right to bring a fraudulent transfer action, we hold that it
should not have been applied here.5
2
United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. 53 also
applied Landgraf, holding that substantive changes like scienter and
damages do not apply retroactively. Thus, the Newshan court refused to
apply heightened damages and penalties provisions to preamendment
conduct due to their "retroactive effect":
The Court finds that eliminating proof of specific intent to defraud
49. Susan S. Gonick & Joseph D. Daley, The Nonretroactivity of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 60 (1997). Gonick was a partner of mine, while Daley is an
associate of mine.
50. The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the Landgraf analysis where a suit alleging pre-
amendment conduct was not filed until after the effective date. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244 (1994). See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (new "Torture
Victim Protection Act" not applied in impermissible retroactive manner because torture has always been
condemned); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316,320 (9th Cir. 1996) (application of new arbitration
rle allowed only because it took away non-substantive right to jury trial); United States ev rel. Schumer v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1995) (application of amended False Claims Act allowed
only because Court erroneously held that jurisdictional provisions did not infringe on defendants'
substantive rights), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (holding that jurisdictional provisions did in fact infringe
on the defendants' substantive rights); United States er rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Corp., 61 F.3d
1402, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1319 (1996); see also, e.g., supra note 44
(setting forth the Landgrafanalysis).
51. 82 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 1996).
52. Id. (citations omitted).
53. 907 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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changes the legal consequences of past conduct and therefore, has
retroactive effect. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ninth Circuit law,
as it existed prior to 1986, applies to conduct predating the effective
date of the 1986 Amendments. For conduct occurring after [the
effective date], the scienter requirement prescribed by the 1986
Amendments applies. 4
Recent decisions interpreting the Reform Act comport with Landgraf
After noting the Reform Act's silence on retroactivity, District 65 Retirement
Trust v. Prudential Securities, Inc.55 held that the Reform Act's elimination
of RICO claims for securities fraud did not eliminate defendants' RICO
liability for pre-enactment conduct:
[T]he Court focuses upon whether section 107 "impair[s] rights a
party possessed when he acted."
In this case, no questions of procedural rules or jurisdictional
scope are presented. And, to apply the statute retrospectively in light
of the Supreme Court's admonition that retroactive application is
disfavored, would work a "manifest injustice" on plaintiffs. No
expectations of defendants are altered by this decision.56
Likewise, In re Prudential Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation,
57
cited District 65 as "[t]he only district court to address the question of
whether there was a clear expression in this statute," finding that Congress
had deliberately chosen not to apply the "'expansive securities law changes
retroactively."'58 It rejected the defendants' attempt to bar RICO claims as it
would "impair the plaintiffs' ability to recover for actions which may have
violated federal law."59 Quoting the Reform Act's effective-date language,
54. Id. (emphasis added). Courts from other circuits have similarly applied Landgraf See, e.g.,
Maitland v. University of Minn., 43 F.3d 357, 361 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The date offiling is irrelevant;
the date of 'the events in suit,' [citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 244] determines whether a court must
consider a statute's potential retroactive effect." (emphasis added)); Reid v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc.,
No. 93-5796, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5595, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 1995) ("Based on [Landgrajs]
rationale andfocus on preenactment conduct, I conclude that Landgraf compels the conclusion that the
Act does not apply retroactively to cases where ... the alleged ... conduct occurred before [the
effective date of the Act], but the complaint was filed after that date." (emphasis added)).
55. 925 F. Supp. 1551, 1569-70 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
56. Id. at 1569-70 (citation omitted and emphasis added). Moreover, District 65 stated: "Had this
action primarily involved securities fraud claims ... Congress's explicit requirement of prospective
application may very well have encompassed the entire action and allowed both the RICO claims and
securities fraud claims to proceed." Id at 1570 n.8 (emphasis added).
57. 930 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
58. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Prudential Securities, Inc. Ltd. Partnership court concluded: "This
section thus makes it clear that the Act applies only prospectively to actions
under the securities laws."60  Other courts recently reached similar
conclusions: McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine61 held that the PSLRA does
not have retroactive applications.
As this litany of precedent cases proves, Zeid v. Kimberley,62 In re Silicon
Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation,63 and Hockey v. Medhekar,64 all holding
the PSLRA may be applied retroactively, were decided before Hughes and
are incorrect.
III. THE REFORM ACT DID NOT ALTER THE RECKLESSNESS LIABILITY
STANDARD FOR NoN-FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
In moving to dismiss Reform Act cases, defendants often suggest that
because Congress did not include motive, opportunity, and recklessness
language from Second Circuit decisions in the Reform Act, legislators must
have intended to require that a plaintiff allege conscious behavior pleading
and that mere motive and opportunity will not do. The legislative structure
and history, however, demonstrates this conclusion is incorrect.65
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 6 held that the 1934 Act requires "some
element of scienter" and could not be read to impose liability for "wholly
faultless conduct," "negligent conduct alone," or acts conducted in "'good
faith."' 6 7 The Court indicated that recklessness-which does not impose
liability for negligent, faultless, or good faith conduct-may satisfy the
scienter requirement because "[in certain areas of the law recklessness is
considered to be a form of intentional conduct .... ,,68 Since Hochfelder,
every court of appeals that has considered whether recklessness suffices for
the scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5 has held that it does and none has
rejected it.69
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 976 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.J. 1997).
62. 973 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
63. 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
64. 932 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
65. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why
the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 977-85 (1996); Michael A. Perino, A Strong
Inference of Fraud? An Early Interpretation of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1
SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 397,402-05 (1996).
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
67. Id. at 198, 201,206.
68. Id. at 193 n.12.
69. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane);
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (1 th Cir. 1985); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-
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Since Hochfelder, Congress had twenty years to overturn its holding that
recklessness is sufficient, yet it declined to do so. Congress is presumed to be
aware of a longstanding judicial interpretation when it amends a statute.7° In
passing the Reform Act, Congress could have changed the liability standard.
It chose to do so with respect to certain forward-looking statements, 71 and to
limit joint-and-several liability, 72 however, it declined to disturb the
recklessness standard in any other respect. No provision in the Reform Act
explicitly eliminates recklessness as a standard of liability for all actions
under Rule lOb-5. In fact, the Reform Act carefully eliminated recklessness
liability in only two enumerated contexts, that is, forward-looking statements
and joint-and-several liability.
If Congress intended for an actual-knowledge requirement to apply to
statements outside the safe harbor, why did it expressly limit the safe harbor
to certain forward-looking statements,73 subject to numerous exclusions?74
The exclusion of most statements from the safe-harbor's actual-knowledge
requirement provisions obviously was designed to preserve recklessness
liability for any statements not within the safe harbor. The statute's
provisions limiting the safe-harbor scope would be nullified by holding an
actual-knowledge requirement applies without regard to whether statements
are forward looking.
Thus, several courts have concluded that the Reform Act did not
eliminate recklessness liability or the motive-and-opportunity pleading test.
Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.," held that there is
"no basis to conclude that Congress altered the mental state requirement";
thus, recklessness was still sufficient to establish the scienter required for a
violation. 76  Marksman Partners further held "that Second Circuit
jurisprudence comes closest to approximating the PSLRA's new [pleading]
requirements," and "the 'motive and opportunity' test has not been
discarded. ' 77 Judge Williams reached a similar conclusion in Zeid v.
18(10th Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044
(7th Cir. 1977).
70. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
71. See U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Supp. 1 1996).
72. See id. § 78u-4(g).
73. See id. § 78u-5(c).
74. See id. § 78u-5(b).
75. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
76. See id. at 1309 n.9.
77. Id- at 1310.
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Kimberley 8: "There are two distinct ways in which a plaintiff may plead
scienter .... First, a plaintiff can allege 'facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.' Second, a plaintiff can
allege facts 'establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do
so.' 79 Most courts, it seems, are holding that the PSLRA adopted the Second
Circuit's pleading standard, including its "motive-and-opportunity" test.80
78. 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
79. Id. at438 (citations omitted).
80. See Zeid, 930 F. Supp. at 438 ("[A] plaintiff can allege 'facts constituting circumstantial
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior' [or] allege facts 'establishing a motive to commit
fraud and an opportunity to do so."' (citations omitted)); Marksman, 927 F. Supp. at 1309 n.9, 1310
(finding "no basis to conclude that Congress altered the mental state requirement"); Rehm v. Eagle
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. I11. 1997) (saying "§ 78u-4(b)(2) adopts the Second Circuit
standard"); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. III. 1997) (following Rehm and
holding "'motive and opportunity.' or "'facts that constitute a strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness' are sufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter
(citation omitted)); STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., No. CA 3:96-CV-0823-R, 2 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
25, 1996) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted as a finding of the court, STI
Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. CA 3:96-CV-0823-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21082 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 12, 1996) (following Marksman, using the "motive and opportunity" test); Fischler v.
AmSouth Bancorp., No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 14, 1996) (finding the "motive and opportunity" standard for raising a "strong inference" of
scienter remains); Page v. Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673, at *27
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997) (following Fischler and applying the "motive and opportunity" and "strong
circumstantial evidence" test); In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (determining the "Second Circuit's pleading standard was not abrogated by the
PSLRA"); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 81, 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (saying the PSLRA
standard is based on Second Circuit precedent); In re Wellcare Mgmt. Group See. Litig., 964 F. Supp.
632, 638-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying the "motive and opportunity" and "conscious or reckless
behavior" test); Galaxy Inv. Fund v. Fenchurch Capital Management, No. 96 C 8098, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13207 (N.D. III. Aug. 29, 1997), adopted as a finding of the court, Galaxy Inv. Fund v.
Fenchurch Capital Management No. 96 C 8098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21498 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 23,
1997); see also Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997); Shahzad v. H.J.
Meyers & Co., No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1128, at *19-20 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
6, 1997); Sloane Overseas Fund v. Sapiens Int'l Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
However, five decisions have gone the other way. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Sec. Litig., 970
F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, 959 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1997); Powers
v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Hockey v. Medhekar, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,465 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Voit v. Wonderware Corp, 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
In Silicon Graphics, Judge Smith mistakenly held that the Reform Act rejects the motive-and-oppor-
tunity test and requires allegations of actual knowledge of falsity or conscious behavior, eliminating
recklessness liability. See 970 F. Supp. at 763. In connection with the briefing on defendants' renewed
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the SEC responded by filing an amicus curiae
brief. In Friedberg, Judge Edward Harrington followed Silicon Graphics, but upheld the complaint
based on allegations of insider selling. See 959 F. Supp. at 51. Similarly, in Powers, Judge Rudi
Brewster followed Silicon Graphics but upheld the complaint based on allegations of insider selling,
explaining that Judge Smith's prior opinion was in error on this point. See 977 F. Supp. at 1039. Volt
also upheld the complaint under the higher standard based on allegations of insider selling and use of
corporate stock to make an acquisition. See 977 F. Supp. at 374.
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A. The Text and Structure of the Reform Act Shows That Congress Did
Not Eliminate Motive, Opportunity and Recklessness as Means of
Establishing Scienter
Congress clearly intended for recklessness to suffice for establishing
liability outside the narrow safe-harbor provision and to allow for such
recklessness to be established by allegations of motive and opportunity to
defraud. Section 21D(b)(2) does not reject the recklessness standard for
establishing scienter in section 10(b) cases. It states that plaintiffs must plead
facts "giving rise to a strong inference" of "the required state of mind."' The
"strong inference" standard comes from Second Circuit case law; the Second
Circuit has long held that plaintiffs must raise a "strong inference" of scienter
by alleging motive and opportunity or by pleading facts that show either
reckless or conscious behavior.82 Nothing in the text of section 21D(b)(2)
suggests that it overrules the Second Circuit case law, whose very language it
enacted, as to the kind of facts which suffice to raise "a strong inference" of
intentional fraud or recklessness. Nor does anything in section 21D(b)(2)
suggest that it overrules the decisions holding that allegations of motive and
opportunity or recklessness establish scienter.83 Had Congress intended to
abrogate the Second Circuit precedents creating the "strong-inference"
pleading standard, it would not have explicitly adopted its "strong-inference"
formulation.
Moreover, the "required state of mind" for a section 10(b) violation
encompasses recklessness. "Scienter may be satisfied by either proof of
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168,
1173 (2d Cir. 1994); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
Time Warner Inc. See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993); Breard v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941
F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79-80, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1990);
Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1989); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d
46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (2d Cir. 1979).
83. In the Ninth Circuit, insider trading or other allegations of motive and opportunity plead scienter.
See, e.g., Provenz v. Miller, 102 F3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir. 1996) (indicating stock sales by insiders is
evidence of scienter); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 1995) (saying a corporate offering of
securities and insider stock sales "are circumstantial evidence that the defendants knew or had reason to
know that the financial condition of the Company was deteriorating well before they disclosed the problems
with the expansion program"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1422 (1996); Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1379
(9th Cir. 1994) (saying insider stock sales raise an inference of scienter); In re Wells Fargo See. Litig., 12
F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting "allegations of motive and opportunity in the complaint are sufficient
to establish a basis for inferring.., fraudulent intent"); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109,
1117 (9th Cir. 1989) (saying "[i]nsider trading in suspicious amounts or at suspicious times is probative of
bad faith and scienter"); Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1365 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding an
opportunity to sell options raised an inference ofscienter under Second Circuit standards).
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actual knowledge or recklessness." 84 Had Congress intended to overrule the
established law and require actual knowledge of falsity, it would have said
so. Instead, its choice of the phrase "the required state of mind," was
designed topreserve recklessness as a basis of liability for most section 10(b)
claims.
When in other parts of the Reform Act Congress eliminated liability for
reckless conduct, it said so. Congress chose to provide in section 21E a
narrow "safe harbor" from recklessness liability for "forward-looking
statements. 85 Section 21E's new requirement that plaintiffs prove "actual
knowledge" of falsity only for certain forward-looking statements would be
meaningless if plaintiffs were always required to prove "actual knowledge"
of falsity for any section 10(b) violation.8 6 Congress excluded many
statements from the safe harbor and its actual-knowledge requirement.
87
Extending the safe-harbor's actual-knowledge scienter standard to all
statements would frustrate all of these carefully-framed qualifications and
exclusions.
Similarly, the provisions of the Reform Act which limit joint liability for
reckless conduct carefully preserve the rule that reckless conduct gives rise to
liability. Section 21D(g) states that "[fior purposes of this subsection" only, a
defendant "'knowingly commits a violation of the securities laws' only if it
acts "with actual knowledge" of falsity.88 Section 21D(g) also specifies that,
for this subsection alone, "reckless conduct by a covered person shall not be
construed to constitute a knowing commission of a violation of the securities
laws by that covered person."89 This limitation, however, does not affect the
basic scienter standards for establishing a violation of section 10(b):
"Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create, affect, or in any
manner modify, the standard for liability associated with any action arising
under the securities laws."90 The Reform Act thus expressly preserves the
existing decisional law holding that recklessness suffices to establish the
scienter element for a section 10(b) violation.91
84. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232-33 & n.20 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (Supp. H 1996). To establish liability for a statement within the safe
harbor, plaintiffs must show that the statement "if made by a natural person, was made with actual
knowledge by that person that the statement was Ualse or misleading." Id
86. See id. § 78u-5(c).
87. See id. § 78u-5(b).
88. Id. § 78u-4(g)(10)(A) (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 78u-4(g)(10)(B).
90. Id. § 78u-4(g)(1) (emphasis added).
91. The joint-and-several liability scheme of the Reform Act provides that any defendant "against
whom a final judgment is entered in a private action shall be liable for damages jointly and severally only if
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B. The Legislative History Shows that Congress Intended for Courts to
Seek Guidance from Second Circuit Precedents and Infer Scienter from
Motive, Opportunity or Recklessness
Two sentences in the Conference Report,92 some argue, suggest that
section 21D(b)(2) was intended to prevent a plaintiff from raising a strong
inference of scienter by pleading motive and opportunity; instead, conscious
behavior, not mere recklessness, must be pled.93 However, a review of the
legislative history shows that Congress intended courts to seek guidance
from Second Circuit precedents on how a "strong inference" of scienter may
be pled. Congress did not intend to reject decisions adopting motive and
opportunity as a means of establishing scienter. The "strong inference"
language was added to bring all courts into line with Second Circuit
the trier of fact specifically determines that such covered person knowingly committed a violation ofthe
securities laws." AL § 78u-4(gX2XA) (emphasis added). This section recognizes that "final judgment' may
be entered without such a finding, but will result in joint-and-several liability only upon a finding of
knowing conduct, and in less-sweeping "proportionate liability" on a finding of recklessness. To impose a
knowing-conduct standard for liability for all statements or conduct would render the entire joint-and-
several liability section of the Reform Act meaningless, as there could never be nonknowing liability for
which a person would only be proportionately liable.
92. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995).
93. The Managers stated, "Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing
pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard." Id. at 41. A footnote added that "the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." Id. at 48 n.23. Such language
was proposed for inclusion by Senator Arlen Specter. See 141 CONG. REc. 59170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
However, since Congress did strengthen the Second Circuit pleading standard by adding as the first prong
of its pleading standard the Ninth Circuit's GlenFed standard (requiring the pleading of each false statement
and why it is false), these statements are consistent with a continued use of the Second Circuit's motive-
and-opportunity testplus the Ninth Circuit's GlenFed test. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541
(9th Cir. 1994). The rejection of the Specter Amendment, which sought to insert specific language
about motive, opportunity, and recklessness, see 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995),
does not mean that Second Circuit precedents were expressly rejected or overruled. Senator Dodd
explained that the Specter Amendment was rejected/or deviating from Second Circuit case law. See
141 CONG. REC. S19,068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (quoting Professor Grundfest's characterization of
the Specter Amendment as "'an incomplete and inaccurate codification of case law in the [Second]
circuit'). Senator Dodd explained that, far from foreclosing reliance on Second Circuit precedent, the
Conference Committee actually expected courts to look to that court's decisions for guidance:
You could have gone in, I suppose, and said why did you not include the other language [from the
Second Circuit precedents] here? The problem was, in a sense, by codifiying [judicial] guidance
you get into an area where you can get some differences of opinion on this. And arguably it could
have, I suppose gone back and included all of it, but the decision was to take it out on the
assumption that the courts will look to the guidance.
Id. (emphasis added). Senator Dodd believed that with the standard established in the statute, "[t]hen
the guidance ofthe court would befollowed." Id. (emphasis added). He explained: "We have met the
second circuit standard here, as indicated by the memorandum from Judge Grundfest, Professor
Grundfest at Stanford. We have met that standard. We have left out the guidance. That does not mean
yvu disregard it." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, Senator Dodd observed that "the suggestion that
somehow the courts are going to disregard the guidance... I think overstates the case." Id. at S 19,071.
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precedents on pleading scienter.
The courts of appeals had interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways,
creating distinctly different pleading standards among the circuits.
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading
standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the
Committee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading
standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent
pleading standard, the Second Circuit test requires that the plaintiff
plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's
fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although courts
may find this body of law instructive. 94
The legislative history contradicts any notion that the Conference
Committee disavowed recklessness and motive and opportunity as methods
of establishing liability. Senator Moseley-Braun observed that while "the
original House bill abolished liability for reckless conduct; the Senate bill did
not, and the Senate position prevailed in conference." 95 Representative
Bliley, who served as Manager for the House on the Conference Committee,
confirmed that, with the exception of the safe harbor and proportionate-
liability provisions, "[t]he conference report is careful not to change
standards of liability under the securities laws.' 96 The Managers themselves
uniformly understood the Conference Report to adopt the pleading standard
from the Second Circuit case law. Senator Dodd explained that the Reform
Act "adopt[ed] the Second Circuit Court of Appeals standard.' 97 The
Conference Report therefore contrasted with the earlier House Bill, which
"established pleading standards that were so high... that it would have been
impossible to bring a suit ... had the [earlier] House language been
adopted. ' 98 The Reform Act, therefore, is "using a pleadings standard that
has been successfully tested.., in the real world." 99
Senator Domenici similarly explained that "the conference report adopts
the pleading standard utilized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, where
94. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
95. 141 CONG. REC. S 17,984 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
96. 141 CONG. REc. H14,040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995).
97. 141 CONG. REC. S17,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
98. Id. at S17,959 (statement of Sen. Dodd). See id. at S17,957 (statement of Sen. Dodd) ("The
conference report clarifies current requirements that lawyers should have some facts.., to back up their
assertion of security fraud by adopting most of the reasonable standards established by the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals"); Id at S17959 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (the conferees intended to "adopt the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals standard").
99. Id. at S17,957 (emphasis added).
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a large number of securities fraud lawsuits are brought."'"" Domenici stated
that among its advantages was the body ofprecedent applying the "strong-
inference" standard: "This court-tested standard requires plaintiffs to plead
facts in their complaint which give rise to a strong inference of securities
fraud."'' Senators Dodd and Domenici knew what they were talking about:
they authored this, "the Dodd-Domenici bill," shepherded it through
Congress, and served as Managers for the Senate on the Conference
Committee.
02
When Senator Specter asked if the Conference Report repudiated Second
Circuit case law, Senator Dodd told him that it did not: "Basically, what we
intended to do here was to codify the second circuit's pleadings
standards."' 3 Senator Dodd added that courts would be free to follow the
Second Circuit case law, explaining that although "the committee does not
intend ... to codify the second circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard," nonetheless "courts may find this body [of] law instructive."'0 4
Senator Dodd elaborated, explaining:
[I]nstead of trying to take each case that came under the second
circuit, we are trying to get to the point where we would have well-
pleaded complaints. We are using the standards in the second circuit in
that regard, then letting the courts-as these matters will-test. They
can then refer to specific cases, the second circuit, [or] otherwise, to
determine if these standards are [met] based on facts and
circumstances in a particular case. That is what we are trying to do
here.10
5
100. Id. atS17,969.
101. Id.
102. Other members of the Conference Committee agreed with them that the statute came from the
Second Circuit case law. Senator Grams, who served with Senators Dodd and Domenici on the Conference
Committee as a Manager for the Senate, confirmed that the legislation provided for "[cJodification of the
pleading standard adopted by the second circuit court of appeals." Id at S17,993. Another Conference
Committee Manager, Senator D'Amato, explained that the Conference Report "creates a uniform standard
for complaints that allege securities fraud," and that "[t]his standard is already the law in New York," i.e.,
the Second Circuit. Id. at S 17,934. "It requires a plaintiff plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of the
defendant's fraudulent intent." Id.
103. Id. at S17,960 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id. Other legislators took the Managers at their word. Senator Moseley-Braun concluded that,
although "[i]n the area of pleading, the House bill adopted a standard that was significantly higher than the
second circuit standard, which was the standard adopted in the Senate bill," it was "[t]he Senate position
[that] prevailed at conference." Id. at S 17,984 (emphasis added). Senator Hatch agreed that "the legislation
adopts the second circuit pleading standard...." Id. at S 17,966 (emphasis added). Senator Dole also
believed that the bill "adopts the second circuit's pleading standard." Id. at S 17,983 (emphasis added).
According to the bill's leading proponent, "motive" would provide the necessary "strong
19981
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Thus far, most courts have held the PSLRA did not eliminate recklessness
liability.
0 6
IV. THE REFORM ACT'S PLEADING STANDARD IS SATISFIED BY
ALLEGATIONS OF MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT FRAUD OR
FACTS SHOWING CONSCIOUS MISBEHAVIOR OR RECKLESS DISREGARD
Nothing about the Reform Act indicates an intention to hinder vigorous
prosecution of meritorious suits. To the contrary, Congress reaffirmed the
importance of private enforcement of the securities laws. The Conference
Report'0 7 states:
The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect
investors ....
The private securities litigation system is too important to the
integrity of American capital markets to allow this system to be
undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits. Private securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
inference" of scienter. In debate on the veto override, Senator Dodd adopted the conclusion of a
former SEC commissioner that under "the securities litigation conference report, the pleading standard
is faithfiul to the Second Circuit's test." 141 CONG. REC. S19,067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement
of Senator Dodd) (quoting letter of Stanford University Professor Joseph Grundfest). Senator Dodd
assured Congress that this "pleading standard articulated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is
intended simply to require the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of
motive to defraud."' Id. (emphasis added). Senator Dodd explained, "We have established the standard
clearly. We have clearly established the standard of alleging facts with particularity, showing a strong
inference of motive." Id. at S 19,068 (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., Epstein v. Itron, No. CS-97-214-RHW (E.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 1998); Fugman v.
Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. IlI. 1997); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp.
192 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Welleare Mgmt. Group Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Page v.
Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997); Rehm v.
Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. I11. 1997); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., No. 96-3711 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 1997); Galaxy
Inv. Fund v. Fenchurch Capital Management, No. 96 C 8098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 29, 1997), adopted as a finding of the court, Galaxy Inv. Fund v. Fenchurch Capital
Management, No. 96 C 8098 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1997).
107. HR. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995). Few if any of the suits bear any indicia of the types of suits
which prompted the Reform Act. The complaints are not being filed by "professional plaintiffs," but rather
by investors who never before brought a class action suit. The complaints are not filed immediately
following, nor are they based merely on, a stock drop. Rather, they are detailed and reflect significant pre-
filing investigation, including specific allegations of motive, positive representations contradicted by
undisclosed internal business problems which were inconsistent with these representations, plus-in many
cases-very significant insider selling. The suits are the very kind of carefully prepared cases, attacking
realfraud by insider traders, that Congress, by weeding outfrivolous or abusive suits, wanted victims to be
able to prosecute more effectively.
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losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private
lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets
and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their
jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities litigation system to
that high standard.
This Conference Report seeks to protect investors, issuers, and all
who are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities
litigation. This legislation ... discourage[s] fivolous litigation.10 8
The Reform Act does not change Rule 12(b)(6). The allegations still must
be taken as true and suits must be dismissed only if no conceivable set of
facts could be proved entitling plaintiffs to relief0 9 The Reform Act does
require that "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading," and
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.""1 10
However, these requirements are not new. The Reform Act combined the
Ninth Circuit's GlenFed requirement that a plaintiff plead the false
statements and why they are false with the Second Circuit's requirement that
facts be plead to support an inference of scienter to create a uniform pleading
standard."' The Reform Act requires that a complaint raise '"a strong
inference of scienter."'l12 While 'great specificity [is] not required with
respect to ... allegations of ... scienter,"' a plaintiff must provide 'a
minimal factual basis"' for its conclusion that a defendant acted with
scienter." 3 A "minimal factual basis" suffices if the allegations give rise to a
"'strong inference' of scienter,"'"14 through either of two approaches." 5
One method for establishing an inference of scienter is to allege facts
showing a motive for committing fraud and a clear opportunity for doing
108. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (stating that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief'); Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1304.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(bX1) & (b)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
111. See H.R CONF. REP. 104-369, at 91 (1995).
112. Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); see also In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9
F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1994); Breard v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir 1991).
113. Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see Turkish, 27 F.3d at 28;
Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69; Breard, 941 F.2d at 143-44; Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070
(2d Cir. 1985).
114. Turkish, 27 F.3d at 28.
115. See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69.
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SO. I16 This may be done "through allegations of a motive to deceive and
access to accurate information."' 7 Another approach "is to allege facts
constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious
behavior."" 8 Opportunity, however, is normally clear. The insiders control
the public dissemination of information about their company. They are the
ones speaking to analysts and the markets. Under such circumstances, "no
one doubts that the defendants had the opportunity, if they wished, to
manipulate the price of [the] stock."'"19
Insider selling constitutes a motive and establishes scienter under both
Second and Ninth Circuit decisions. Goldman v. Belden120 sustained a
complaint based on an assertion that 'failure to qualify the bullish statements
was intended to permit individual defendants to profit from an inflated
market price before the truth became known."'121 Goldman held that scienter
was adequately alleged as to a defendant who sold twenty-six percent of his
stock. t
22
Dolgow v. Anderson 23 is instructive. There, the plaintiff alleged the
officers and directors of Monsanto engaged in a scheme to inflate Monsanto
stock during a two-year period by false statements that exaggerated
Monsanto's future performance. The officers and directors then exercised
stock options and sold large amounts of their Monsanto shares near the
stock's all-time high of over eighty dollars, before it fell to thirty-nine dollars
116. See Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1173-74; Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13; Goldman, 754 F.2d at
1070; accord In re Wells Fargo See. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "allegations
of motive and opportunity ... are sufficient to establish a basis for inferring ... fraudulent intent");
Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1988).
117. Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1173-74.
118. In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Breard, 941 F.2d at
144.
119. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1174; Marksman Partners, L.P. v.
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
120. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 1070 (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 1070-71. Cosmas held that allegations that insiders owned stock that they might sell
raised a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter.
[The allegations in the amended complaint herein do establish a motive. The amended complaint
asserts that the defendants owned shares ... and that the allegedly fraudulent statements
artificially inflated or maintained the prices of [the stock].... [W]e conclude that the amended
complaint satisfied the scienter requirement of Rule 9(b).
Cosmas, 866 F.2d at 12-13. See also Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1365 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987),
which similarly held that the opportunity to sell options raised an inference of scienter. Time Warner
held that a corporate rights offering provided the motive for insiders to manipulate the price of its
stock, "thereby enabling the company to set the rights offering price somewhat higher than would have
been possible without the misleading statements and to lessen the dilutive effect of the offering." Time
Warner, 9 F.3d at 269 (emphasis added).
123. 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
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when bad news came out.124 The defendants claimed their stock sales were
"in line with their transactions in Monsanto stock in previous periods,"' 25 and
were due to innocent motives, that is, to diversify their holdings, obtain cash,
and repay loans. In denying summary judgment, the Second Circuit noted
that even though defendants' overall holdings of Monsanto stock increased
during the class period due to stock option purchases, summary judgment
was not proper as their "alleged innocent motives are not inconsistent with
plaintiffs' allegations that they were selling on the basis of material inside
information," and the stock sales were evidence of scienter.126 In the Ninth
Circuit, meanwhile, insiders' sales are "evidentiary facts" indicating the
insiders knew their statements were false. 127 The insider trading allegations in
these cases are sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter.
A complaint also pleads scienter under the second approach if it pleads
facts indicating reckless or conscious behavior. 128 In the Ninth Circuit,
plaintiffs supplied sufficient evidence of scienter in various cases with the
following allegations:
* Allegations that defendants knew or recklessly ignored that their
statements were false. 29
0 Allegations that the defendants knew the statements were false. 130
124. See id. at 827.
125. Id. at 828.
126. See id. at 827-28.
127. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1491 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving one insider who sold
200/ of shares for $1.3 million, a second who sold 90,000 shares, and a third who-after making many
of the false statements-sold 3265 shares); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994)
(sales of 30,000 shares for $1.6 million by two insiders); Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1379 (9th Cir.
1994) ($13.5 million in sales by two officers); Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927
F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (sale of 20% of one insider's holdings); Fisher v. Acuson Corp.,
No. C-93-20477-RMW(EAI), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19968, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1995) (960,000
shares sold for $29.7 million); In re Gupta Corp. See. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1231-32 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (sales by six insiders totaling $4.2 million); In re Seagate Technology II See. Litig., 843 F.
Supp. 1341, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (sale of 30% of one insider's holding-125,000 shares-for $2.5
million); O'Sullivan v. Trident Microsystems, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,116, at 98,905 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ($10 million in stock sales); Rogal v. Costello, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,245, at 95,094 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (814,489 shares sold
for $25.6 million); Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 605 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (sales of
271,459 shares for $4.5 million by five officers and directors-1 1%, 21%, 61%, 68% and 80% of their
holdings); In re 3COM See. Litig., 761 F. Supp. 1411, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ($2 million in stock sales
by two corporate insiders); Klein v. King, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,002, at 95,605 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (sales by 11 insiders for $36 million).
128. See Breard v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1991).
129. See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 1993); Blake v. Dierdorff, 856
F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir 1988).
130. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992); Wells Fargo, 12 F.3d at
930-31.
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. Allegations tending to show defendants knew or recklessly ignored
that the statements were misleading, and that the insiders "'stood to
receive more compensation because of the alleged non-disclosure of
material information."' For example, allegations that officers issued
false statements to protect their positions and their compensation and
to increase bonus compensation plead the specific intent to commit
fraud with the requisite particularity.131
* Allegations that a serious stock decline-from forty-five to thirty-
two dollars (twenty-eight percent)--when the company reported an
earnings decline followed shortly (three months) after positive
statements, such that there was "circumstantial evidence that the
optimistic statements were false when made" in the absence of any
intervening catastrophic event.
132
For instance, in Hanon v. Dataproducts, Inc.,133 no insider trading was
alleged. However, the court found other allegations sufficed for the case to
survive a motion to dismiss.
Dataproducts argued its statements regarding its S1480 printer were made
with a good-faith belief in their accuracy. As evidence of its good faith,
Dataproducts asserted that it continued to manufacture, sell and invest
millions of dollars in the S1480 from May 1988 to April 14, 1989, and that
its officers did not sell their stock during the class period.
This may all be true. However, Hanon produced evidence that
Dataproducts, through its responsible employees, knew about the cold
start and ink durability problems with the SI 480 in late 1987 and
early 1988... [T]here is a genuine issue of material fact on the issue
ofscienter134
Similarly, in Wells Fargo,35 where no insider trading was alleged,
plaintiffs provided an inference of scienter by alleging facts showing
defendants knew or recklessly ignored that the statements were misleading,
and that the insiders "'stood to receive more compensation because of the
alleged non-disclosure of material information.""136
131. Wells Fargo, 12 F.3d at 931 (emphasis added).
132. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
133. 976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992).
134. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
135. 12 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1993).
136. Id. at 931.
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V. THE STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR AND THE BESPEAKS CAUTION
DOCTRINE WILL SELDOM SHIELD DEFENDANTS' FALSE FORWARD-
LOOKING STATEMENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW
First, a forward-looking statement qualifies for protection only if it was
"accompanied by a cautionary statement that [the statement] is a forward-
looking statement."'137 If the forward-looking statement is oral, the particular
statement must be so identified. While defendants often claim they made
meaningful cautionary statements in their SEC filings of the factors that
could cause their company's actual results to differ from those forecast, those
warnings are often "boilerplate."138 Even though the problems affecting a
company's business often change for the worse over time, the generalized
cautionary language in their SEC filings does not change in any meaningful
way, thus undercutting any claim by defendants that the cautionary
statements in its filings were, in fact, "meaningful cautionary" warnings, as
opposed to boilerplate language to be utilized later as a defense. Often, the
vague and generalized warning language in SEC filings is itself false and
misleading. 39 Cautionary language in SEC filings cannot qualify as a
meaningful cautionary statement at the pleading stage if it is alleged to be
both boilerplate and false and misleading. Judge Smith held such allegations
would prevent dismissal based on the safe harbor in a Reform Act case. 140
The bespeaks-caution doctrine also can seldom result in dismissal at the
pleadings stage. Often the language in SEC filings that defendants claim
shields them from liability under the bespeaks-caution doctrine is nothing but
a generic statement of the kind of risks that affect any rapidly growing
company. Such statements may be viewed as boilerplate because they
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2XA)(i) (Supp. II 1996).
138. "[Bjoilerplate warnings will not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements .... A cautionary
statement that misstates historical facts is not covered by the Safe harbor, it is not sufficient... :' H.R.
CONF. REP. 104-369, at 43-44 (1995).
139 "To warn that the untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent; to caution that it is
only possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they have already occurred is deceit." In re
Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 515 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); accord Hanon v.
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1992); Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620,
624-25 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, general statements of potential risks which conceal specific existing
problems are actionable. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 171 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayer v. Mylod,
988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Kline v. First W. Gov't See., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir.
1994); In re Prudential See. Inc. Ltd. Partnership Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The
logic behind these decisions is clear. Warnings ofpossible detriment are insufficient ifthey are simply
a smoke screen to cover a company's internal reasonably informed certainty of detriment." (emphasis
added)).
140. See In re Silicon Graphics See. Litig., [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep (CCH)
799,325, at 95,967 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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contain no disclosure of the adverse factors which were then actually
negatively impacting the company's business, and thus, in fact, are false and
misleading if the business was actually being adversely affected by the
problems the warnings characterized as merely risks.141
Bespeaks-caution decisions such as In re Worlds of Wonder Securities
Litigation,142 and In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation,143 where the
challenged forward-looking statement was contained in a prospectus, that is,
the document that itself contained explicit warnings directly related to the
allegedly misrepresented matter are unusual. Most cases involve a series of
false and misleading statements made over a period of months in various
contexts, that is, press releases, interviews, analysts' conference calls,
analysts' meetings, private communications with analysts, etc., which were
not accompanied by cautionary language. Cases like Provenz v. Miller,144
Fecht v. Price Co.,145 Warshaw v. Xoma Corp.,14 6 and Silicon Graphics,147 in
which defendants' claim that cautionary language in SEC filings cancelled
out, as a matter of law, the false and misleading impression created by a
series of optimistic statements made to the market unaccompanied by
warning language, rejected the bespeaks-caution doctrine.
VI. NONSPEAKER DEFENDANTS MAY BE LIABLE AS CONTROL PERSONS
UNDER THE "GROUP-PUBLISHED INFORMATION" OR "DISCLOSE-OR-
ABSTAIN" DOCTRINES OR FOR PARTICIPATING IN A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD
Defendants often contend that only the insiders who actually made the
false statement or signed the document containing the false statement are
legally responsible. This is wrong. Other defendants can be held under the
"group-published information" doctrine for participating in a scheme or
course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit on purchasers of the
stock in issue or under the "abstain-or-disclose" doctrine.
A. Group-Published Information
"In cases of corporate fraud where the false and misleading information is
conveyed in prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, press
141. See id. at 95,967-68.
142. 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
143. 89 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1996).
144. 102 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
145. 70 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995).
146. 74 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1996)
147. [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,325 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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releases, or other 'group-published information,' it is reasonable to presume
that these are the collective actions of the officers. ' 148 The presumption of
group publication applies to defendants who are officers 149 or directors' 50 of
the company. Under the group-publication doctrine, individual defendants
jointly "make" corporate statements. While "aiding and abetting" and
"conspiracy" theories did not survive Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank, N.A.,' 5' group publication remains a valid theory of primary
liability.1
52
B. Disclose-or-Abstain Doctrine
Defendants may also be liable under the disclose-or-abstain doctrine,
whereby a corporate insider is liable under section 10(b) for not disclosing
adverse nonpublic information if he sells corporate stock, even if he does not
actually make any false statements. A recent First Circuit decision confirms
this doctrine. In reversing dismissal of a securities class action complaint, the
First Circuit stated:
There is no doubt that an individual corporate insider in possession of
material nonpublic information is prohibited by the federal securities
laws from trading on that information unless he makes public
disclosure. He must disclose or abstain from trading. See SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d
47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc). A central justification for the "dis-
close or abstain" rule is to deny corporate insiders the opportunity to
profit from the inherent trading advantage they have over the rest of
the contemporaneously trading market by reason of their superior
access to information. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). The rule
eliminates both the incentives that insiders would otherwise have to
delay the disclosure of material information, and minimizes any
148. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig. ("GlenFed IF'), 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added) (quoting Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)).
149. See GlenFedll, 60 F.3d at 593; Wool, 818 F.2d at 1440.
150. See In re Digital Microwave Corp. Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,044, at 94,594 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
151. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also GlenFed II, 60 F.3d at 592.
152. See Glenfed II, 60 F.3d 593; accord In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., CV 96-889
(ADS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10665 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1997); Powers v. Eichen, [Current Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,483 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
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efficiency losses associated with the diversion of resources by insiders
to "beating the market." See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 8.2, at
273-75 (1986). 113
The First Circuit in Shaw v. Digital Equipment used a doctrine explained in
Chiarella v. United States.t54 Chiarelli explains the disclose-or-abstain
doctrine as follows:
The SEC took an important step in the development of § 10(b) when
... [i]n Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the Commission
decided that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares
of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside
information known to him. The obligation to disclose or abstain
derives from [a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information[,
which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders,"
particular officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the
courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would
affect their investment judgment. Id. at 911.
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from (i) the
existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the
unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure. Id. at 912, and n. 15....
... But one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a
duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has
information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them." In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission recognized a
relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a
corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation. This
relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity
of preventing a corporate insider from... tak[ing] unfair advantage of
the uninformed minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
153. Shaw v. Digital Equip., 82 F.3d 1194, 1203 (Ist Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted).
154. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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The federal courts have found violations of § 10(b) where
corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit.
E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005, 92 S. Ct. 561, 30 L.Ed.2d 558 (1971)....
.. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees
that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the
shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.1 55
In a very recent decision, United States v. O'Hagan,15 6 the Supreme Court
reaffirned this doctrine, stating:
Under the "traditional" or "classical theory" of insider trading liability,
§ 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in
the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information. Trading on such information qualifies as a "deceptive
device" under § 10(b), we have affirmed, because "a relationship of
trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by
reason of their position with that corporation." Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1114, 63 L.Ed.2d 348
(1980). That relationship, we recognized, "gives rise to a duty to
disclose [or to abstain from trading] because of the 'necessity of
preventing a corporate insider from ... tak[ing] unfair advantage of
... uninformed ... stockholders."' 1d., at 228-229 (citation omitted).
The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other
155. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added); accord Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) ("an insider will be liable ... for inside trading only where he fails to
disclose material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes 'secret profits' (citation
omitted)).
Numerous post-Chiarella and Dirks decisions have found that insiders owe a duty to a
corporation's shareholders not to trade on material, non-public information. See Feldman v. Simkins
Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[C]orporate insider must abstain from trading in
the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him.
... Insider status is normally reserved for officers, directors, controlling shareholder of a corporation
or those having a special relationship affording access to inside information."). In Kronfeld v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 732 (2d Cir. 1987), the court reversed a summary judgment ruling
in favor of the defendants in a section 10(b) action where the plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to
disclose the relationship between the company and a holding company while they traded on the basis
of that information. See also SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1974) (insider liable for
trading in securities of the company while possessing non-public information about the company's
prospects for a merger).
156. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)
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permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants,
consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a
corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655, n.14, 103 S. Ct.
3255, 3262, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983).'1 7
C. Fraudulent Scheme
Defendants may also be liable for the allegedly false statements that were
allegedly issued as part of a fraudulent scheme or course of business which
operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of the stock in issue even when
the defendants did not personally issue such statements. A complaint that
alleges each of the defendants participated in a scheme to defraud purchasers
of the stock and/or course of business which operated as a fraud or deceit on
the purchasers of the stock can hold all corporate insiders liable under Rule
lOb-5.158 While the Supreme Court in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank
recently held there is no aiding-and-abetting liability under section 10(b), 159
nothing in Central Bank undercut the liability of a defendant who is alleged
to have participated in a fraudulent scheme or a course of business which
operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of securities. Participating in a
fraudulent scheme or course of business that operates as a fraud or deceit is a
primary violation of Rule lOb-5. Central Bank stated: "In any complex
securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators ....
Courts have also helped define the scope of this liability. A scheme is a
'plan or program of something to be done." '161 A "scheme to defraud"
157. The district court of Rhode Island also explained the doctrine:
The duty to disclose triggered by insider trading is commonly known as the "disclose or abstain"
rule, which prohibits an individual corporate insider from trading on inside information unless he
first makes public disclosure. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29, 100 S. Ct. at 1114-15;
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 50....
In the present case, the alleged insider trading by the Individual Defendants, if proven, would
certainly trigger a duty to "disclose or abstain" on the part of the individuals.
Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.R.I. 1996); see also Voit v.
Wonderware, 977 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("a corporate insider assumes an affirmative duty to
disclose when she chooses to trade in shares of her corporation").
158. See Cooper v. Pickett, 122 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997).
159. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
160. Id. at 191 (emphasis added); see also Cooper, 122 F.2d at 1194.
161. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) ("Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934)
defines... 'scheme' as '[a] plan or program of something to be done; an enterprise; a project; as, a business
scheme[, or] [a] crafty, unethical project"'); see also WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1934) (To "scheme" is "[t]o form plans or designs; to devise intrigue."); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(2d ed. 1989) (defining "scheme": "A plan, design; a programme of action ... hence, a plan of action
devised in order to attain some end; a purpose together with a system of measures contrived for its
accomplishment; a project, enterprise.'); BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 1344 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
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encompasses any "plan designed or concocted for perpetrating a fraud."'162 It
has long included any scheme to defraud investors by causing securities to
trade at fraudulently inflated prices.163 When section 10(b) was enacted, such
conduct already was an unlawful "scheme to defraud" under the mail-fraud
statute and today it is called a "fraud on the market" that is actionable under
section 10(b). 164 Every person who engages in a "scheme" to defraud is a
primary violator of Rule 1Ob-5 and section 10(b) and is liable. 65
The Second Circuit recently applied and followed Central Bank in
affirming the section 10(b) liability of a corporate executive who participated
in a scheme to defraud investors but made no false statement himself. The
Second Circuit held:
Primary liability may be imposed "not only on persons who made
fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of
the fraud and assisted in its perpetration." Azrielli v. Cohen Law
Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994).
The evidence presented at trial sufficed to establish that [the
executive] had knowledge of [the corporation's] frauds and
participated in the fraudulent scheme. 1
66
"scheme" as "[a] design or plan formed to accomplish some purpose; a system").
162. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (3d ed. 1969).
163. In Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931), for example, "[t]he fraudulent scheme
charged ... was one for sale of [a mining company's] corporate stock at inflated values, by the
manipulation of the price of the stock on the [stock exchanges] and the circulation of false reports
concerning the mine through the mails." Id. at 774. "In fact, the whole scheme centered around the
establishment of an alleged stock exchange value which is in fact wholly fictitious." Id. at 775.
164. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734
F.2d 740, 744-47 (11th Cir. 1984).
165. See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Competitive Assoc.,
Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Union Carbide
Corp. Consumer Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 466-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re ZZZZ Best Sec.
Litig., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,416, at 97,070 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
In the case ofIn re ZZZZBest Securities Litigation, 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994), the auditor
never certified a financial statement, but only reviewed one interim financial statement. The auditor
never made a statement, but utilized the scheme and course of business rationale. Judge Lew denied
summary judgment, holding the auditor could be held directly liable for the false statements by ZZZZ
Best officers in press releases, SEC filings and a ZZZZ Best prospectus, as they were issued as part of
a fraudulent scheme or course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit on ZZZZ Best stock
purchasers. See id. at 970.
166. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996). This was already the law
in the Ninth Circuit. See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.31, 629 (9th
Cir. 1994) (accountant who participated in letter to SEC that was a part of a fraudulent scheme was
primarily liable); see also Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (recognizing the validity of Software Toolworks on this point); Employers Ins. v. Musick, Peeler
& Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,436 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997), ("defendants' roles as
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This analysis is authorized by the text of section 10(b). According to
Hochfelder, section 10(b)'s prohibition of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" necessarily encompasses any "scheme to defraud."'
167
The Court referred to the dictionary definitions of section 10(b)'s words, to
find that a "device" is '.[tihat which is devised, or formed by design; a
contrivance; an invention; project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a
stratagem; an artifice.... ,, It found that a "contrivance" means '[a] thing
contrived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice.""69 Rule 10b-5
prohibits any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud."' 70 In fact, Rule lOb-5
makes it unlawful for any person "directly or indirectly" to employ "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or ... [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person."'
171
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States'72 held that "the second
subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue statement of a
material fact and the omission to state a material fact," but held that "[tJhe
first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted.',173 It held defendants
violated Rule 10b-5 by participating in "a 'course of business' or a 'device,
scheme or artifice' that operated as a fraud"-even though these defendants
had never themselves said anything that was false or misleading.74 "Not
every violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can
be, or should be, forced into a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'non-
disclosures.' Fraudulent devices, practices, schemes, artifices and courses of
business are also interdicted by the securities laws."'
l
analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with... superior access to non-public information
and participation in both drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish... primary liability").
167. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.20 (1976) (quoting WEBSTER'S
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934)) (emphasis added).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. (emphasis added); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
171. Id. § 240.1ob-5(a),(e) (emphasis added).
172. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
173. Id. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 153 (emphasis added).
175. Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d
Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). The court added that "both misrepresentations and omissions are alleged to
be only one aspect of an elaborate scheme to defraud," and anyone who participated in that scheme is
liable. See id. (emphasis added). Rules 10b-5(1) and (3) are aimed at "bmader schemes of securities fraud"
than are necessarily embodied in false statements or documents, and the "'classic' fraud on the market case
[which] arises out of transactions on an open and developed market" that easily fits within the expansive
language of Rule l0b-5(l) and (3). Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 744, 745 (1 1th Cir 1984).
Thus, in Shores v. S/Mar, 647 F.2d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held en banc that a defendant
who did not make the statements in a misleading offering circular could be held primarily liable as a
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VII. DEFENDANTS MAY BE LIABLE FOR STATEMENTS THEY MADE
TO ANALYSTS AND FOR STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN ANALYSTS'
REPORTS
Modem securities class actions frequently involve insiders' liability for
false statements made by company officers to analysts in conference calls,
and in presentations to or in meetings with analysts. Securities class actions
also involve statements about the company in third party reports by analysts.
Section 10(b) prohibits false statements, whether made "directly or
indirectly,"'176 and section 20(b) specifies that it is unlawful for a person "to
do any act ... which it would be unlawful for such person to do under ...
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means of any
other person."177 "No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of
ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices."'
7 8
Thus, "[n]umerous courts have recognized that Section 10(b) liability can be
predicated upon a defendant's false statement to securities analysts or to the
financial or news media.' 179 Many decisions uphold securities fraud claims
based on false statements to analysts.
180
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 81 adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory
because "market professionals [that is, securities analysts] generally consider
most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby
affecting stock market prices."' 82 Analysts perform a crucial function that "is
participant in a scheme to defraud of which that circular was only a part: "Rather than containing the entire
fraud, the Offering Circular was assertedly only one step in the course of an elaborate scheme." Id
(emphasis added); see also Lipton, 734 F.2d at 744, 745, 747; In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod.
Bus. See. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458,466-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 20(b) defines the scope of conduct that
constitutes a violation of rules promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), and thus of section 10(b) itself. See
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983); Short Sales In Connection With A Public Offering, Securities Act
Release No. 6798, Exchange Act Release No. 26028, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,315, at 89,389 & n.22 (Aug. 25, 1988).
178. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477 (1977).
179. Harvey M. Jasper Retirement Trust v. Ivax Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1260, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
180. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 122 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997) (forecasts and other positive
statements in conference calls and fed to analysts privately for inclusion in reports); Provenz v. Miller,
102 F.3d 1478, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1996) (forecasts and statements about new product in conference
calls with analysts); Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996) (statements to
analysts); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1995) (statements in analysts' reports
prepared with approval and guidance of the company); Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1375 (statements in analyst
report); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1974) (earnings forecast to
meeting of analysts).
181. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
182. Id. at 246 n.24; see Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996).
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necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. '183 The market relies on
analysts to 'ferret out and analyze information,' ... often ... by meeting
with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders.' 84 The
information analysts obtain from corporate insiders provides "the basis for
judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities."'185 Thus, a
company that provides false information to analysts can expect it to mislead
not just them but the entire market.' 8 6
A crucial distinction must be kept in mind, that is, liability of insidersfor
their statements to analysts versus liability of insiders for statements about
their company appearing in reports written by analysts. As to the first
category-statements to analysts-there can be no dispute as to the insiders'
liability for such statements. These are statements made to market
professionals, no different from those in press releases, press interviews or
corporate reports. These are statements by the defendants to the market and if
material, false and issued with scienter, section 10(b) liability attaches.' 87 As
to the second category-liability for statements made by a third party analyst
about a company without any input from the company-because these are
statements by third parties about the issuer, liability is more restrictive and
attaches only if the issuer or insider was "entangled" in the creation of the
report or 8put their "imprimatur, express or implied," on the report's
contents.
Judge Orrick recently synthesized these precedents in In re Cirrus Logic
Securities Litigation: '89
A company can be liable for the opinions and statements of third
parties only if the company "put [its] imprimatur, express or implied"
on the third-party statements. Stac, 89 F.3d at 1410 (quoting VeriFone,
784 F. Supp. at 1486). To succeed on this theory of liability, typically
employed where defendants have not made misleading statements
directly, plaintiffs must show that "the company adopted, endorsed or
sufficiently entangled itself with the [analysts' opinions] to render
183. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 659.
186. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59 & n.17; Warshaw v. Xoma Corp.,
74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir 1995).
187. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1996); Warshaw, 74 F.3d at 959;
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1974).
188. See In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) ('"In order to be liable
for ... third-party forecasts, defendants must have put their imprimatur, express or implied, on the
projections."' (citation omitted)); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same).
189. 946 F. Supp. 1446, 1465-67 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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them attributable to [the company]." Syntex, 855 F. Supp. at 1097 ....
The policy behind the adoption or entanglement requirement for this
theory of liability is that a company should not be held responsible for
the opinions of a third party over which it has no control.
Defendants also argue that they cannot be held liable for allegedly
misleading statements made to analysts, unless plaintiffs can prove
Cirrus's entanglement with, or adoption of, the analysts' reports. This
is not the law. Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(b). There is no exception for misleading statements made to
investment analysts.
Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held
indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or
other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly
liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants
"cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their]
alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties." Warshaw
v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996)....
A company may not lie to securities analysts and avoid liability for
its misrepresentations by refusing to adopt the analyst reports
incorporating the misrepresentations. If a company chooses to speak to
the market on a subject, through an analyst or otherwise, it is obligated
to make a full and fair disclosure to ensure that its statements are not
materially misleading.
The Court finds that a company may be liable under Rule lOb-5 for
its own intentional or reckless misrepresentations to analysts that reach
the market, whether or not the company adopts the resulting analysts'
reports.
190
And as Chief Judge Henderson recently stated:
In other words, plaintiffs have a choice with respect to analyst reports:
they may either show that the corporate insiders adopted the reports,
and thus may treat the reports as direct statements of the corporation,
or they may show that, irrespective of the adoption of the reports,
190. Id. (emphasis added).
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corporate insiders made specific misleading statements to analysts in
the course of particular briefings. 191
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the passage of almost three years since the Reform Act went into
effect, there has yet to be a single court of appeal decision interpreting any of
the Reform Act's substantive provisions. Thus, it is still far too early to
determine what impact the Act will have on the ability of the securities class
action device to continue to fulfill its historic role as both an effective
deterrent of securities fraud, as well as an efficient means by which
individual losses sustained as a result of such fraud can be recovered. The
importance of the Reform Act's provisions has been heightened by the recent
passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which
preempts class actions under the states' securities laws. Thus, investors have
lost their ability to bring class actions in state court for securities fraud.
Whether the loss of this alternative forum will substantively impact
investors' ability to safeguard their interests in the securities markets will be
determined by the resolution of the questions regarding the interpretation of
the Reform Act's various provisions outlined in this paper. If the traditional
scienter standards are reaffirmed, and the pleading standards found to be no
more restrictive than those formerly existing within the Second Circuit, the
loss of the state court forums may not be harmful. If, however, judicial
interpretation of the Reform Act embraces the tortured interpretations offered
by the defendants to date, the resulting gutting of the federal securities laws
will, when combined with the effect of the elimination of any alternative
forum for class actions in the state courts, have disastrous consequences for
our nation's investors and perhaps, ultimately, on its capital markets.
191. Wiesel v. Kennedy, No. C-95-4472 TEH, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1996) (emphasis
in original).
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